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Abstract 
Conservation tender programs have been widely applied to biodiversity conservation in 
Australia and internationally in recent decades. Increasing participation rates is critical to 
these schemes, as competition is required for the cost-effectiveness benefits of the tender 
system to be fully realised. However, knowledge relating to the drivers of landholder 
participation in tender programs is limited. This study aims to identify the relative importance 
of different drivers of participation in Victorian conservation tenders. The novel method of 
maximum entropy ordinal regression is used given the small sample size, and supplemented 
with qualitative data obtained through face-to-face interviews. The regression analysis 
reveals that strong relationships between agencies and landholders and a low administrative 
burden drive increased participation. The provision of education, support, and easily-
integrated management practices, however, may drive lower participation, with landholders 
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confident to undertake conservation activities independently of assistance. Some evidence 
emerges that ten-year contracts may be well-received. A key concern is low additionality in 
biodiversity benefits, with typical tender participants displaying a strong conservation ethic 
and high levels of management activity pre-participation. This work has shown that in 
conservation policies involving self-selection by participants, economic incentives for 
adoption may be less important than non-monetary drivers. 
1. Introduction 
Conservation on public land alone is increasingly acknowledged as being inadequate to slow 
the rapid biodiversity loss occurring globally (Mora and Sale, 2011). Hence, many nations are 
looking towards conservation on private land as an additional solution. Conservation tender 
(CT) programs have been widely implemented in recent decades on an international level. 
The United States Conservation Reserve Program has operated since 1985, and uses a 
competitive tendering process to allocate funding to private landholders for cropland 
retirement (Ribaudo et al., 2001). From 1991–2005, the English Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme in Britain selected successful landholder bids based on value-for-money (Morris, 
2004). In Germany, tenders have been trialled by conservation agencies in lower Saxony and 
North Rhine Westphalia targeting cropland retirement and grassland management 
respectively (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2005).  
In Australia, the first BushTender trial commenced in Victoria in 2001 (Stoneham et al., 
2003), and tender initiatives have since been implemented in Western Australia (Gole et al., 
2005), South Australia (e.g. Connor et al., 2008), Tasmania (MJA, 2010b), and Queensland 
(e.g. Windle and Rolfe, 2008). Many of these initiatives were driven by the National Market-
Based Instrument Pilot Program (NMBIPP) from 2002–2008 (BDA Group, 2009). The large-
scale Environmental Stewardship Program (ESP) has also implemented conservation tenders 
spanning multiple Australian states in recent years (MJA, 2010a).  
CT programs require landholders to competitively bid for conservation funds by nominating 
the compensation they require to adopt specified conservation management activities. 
Theoretically, this ability to extract the opportunity cost of alternative management practices 
for individual landholders allows tenders to achieve regional biodiversity management goals 
on private land at lower cost than other policy options like flat-rate grants (Latacz-Lohmann 
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and Schilizzi, 2005). However, successful tender programs must attract enough landholder 
participants to generate competition and minimise the potential for strategic bidding 
behaviour (Ferraro, 2008). The CT mechanism ensures that each landholder’s bid-
maximising incentive is tempered by a counteracting motivation towards bidding lower to 
remain competitive. With too few participants, this counteracting incentive effect diminishes 
and the likelihood of collusion and strategic behaviour increases (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi, 2005). The encouragement of landholder participation in CT programs is therefore 
vitally important if tender systems are to achieve cost-effective conservation outcomes. 
The primary objective of this analysis is to identify the relative importance of different 
factors that motivate landholders to participate in CT programs for biodiversity conservation. 
An analysis of what drives participation is important to inform the process of tender design 
and thus improve the future implementation of such programs. This work has broad 
international relevance, given the widespread global application of tender programs for 
biodiversity conservation. The broad implementation of CT throughout Australia provides a 
number of valuable case studies. 
Drivers of participation in Australian CT programs have received previous research attention. 
Following the BushTender trial, the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment 
collated the results of market research surveys that obtained feedback from both participant 
and non-participant landholders regarding the tender approach (DSE, 2006). Whitten et al. 
(2007) drew upon experience with competitive tender programs in Queensland, Victoria and 
New South Wales to propose a framework for identifying potential impediments to 
participation. Relevant research has also been conducted in Queensland, where the 
motivations and barriers to landholder participation in three different biodiversity 
conservation programs have been assessed (Moon and Cocklin, 2011; Moon et al., 2012). 
One component of a large-scale investigation of multiple Australian incentive programs 
assessed the influence of various landholder characteristics on participation (Morrison et al., 
2008). Zammit (2013) reported on the social benefits of landholder engagement in tender 
programs within the Tasmanian Forest Conservation Fund (MJA, 2010b) and ESP (MJA, 
2010a). This analysis differs from these studies for two reasons. First, it is the first to use 
maximum entropy ordinal regression techniques to assess the relative importance of multiple 
drivers of participation in CT programs specifically. Thus, it differs from the application of 
4 
 
Morrison et al. (2008) in which binary logistic regression is used. Second, it is the first study 
to include program design and context features rather than landholder characteristics alone. 
2. Methods and Data 
2.1 Case study background 
Survey participants had been involved in BushTender, EcoTender or Green Graze programs 
for biodiversity conservation in Victoria. The first BushTender in 2001 consisted of two 
trials: one in Gippsland and the other in North Central Victoria (DSE, 2006). The program 
targeted biodiversity conservation outcomes, offering three-year contracts to landholders 
based on management inputs. Successful bids were selected using a Biodiversity Benefits 
Index, that evaluated value-for-money in terms of a Biodiversity Significance Score and a 
Habitat Services Score (Stoneham et al., 2003). Variations of BushTender have since 
emerged throughout Victoria. For example, EcoTender extends the BushTender model to 
consider environmental outcomes beyond biodiversity conservation (Eigenraam et al., 2007). 
Green Graze was a pilot project implemented in the Goulburn Broken and North Central 
catchments of Victoria, which sought to promote improved vegetation cover on livestock 
farms (Moll et al., 2007). 
2.2 Methods overview 
The research was conducted as follows: 
1. Unstructured interviews were carried out with experienced practitioners to identify 
potential key drivers of landholder participation in CT. 
2. Extensive literature review was undertaken to generate further information and deeper 
understanding of identified drivers. 
3. The information gained in Steps 1 and 2 was used to formulate a structured 
quantitative/qualitative survey instrument investigating the drivers of higher 
probabilities of participation in future CT programs.  
4. The structured survey was iteratively refined based on peer review by researchers 
within various government and regional catchment management institutions.  
5. The structured survey was personally implemented through face-to-face methods. 
6. Descriptive statistics were computed for all quantitative data. 
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7. Generalised maximum entropy regression analysis was conducted to quantitatively 
investigate drivers of higher probabilities of participation in future CT programs. 
8. Qualitative data was coded into themes to support the quantitative results. 
9. Results from the descriptive statistics and regression analyses were matched with 
qualitative data to deepen understanding of the quantitative results.  
2.3 Survey design and implementation 
The unstructured interviews of experienced practitioners (Step 1 in Section 2.2) consisted of a 
very broad discussion of the general strengths and weaknesses of Australian CT, and key 
areas of potential improvement. Furthermore, these discussions provided input into the 
literature review with interviewees asked to suggest useful references relevant to the research 
question. 
The combined quantitative/qualitative structured survey for landholders (Step 5 in Section 
2.2) investigated the following broad topics as related to participation in CT: 
1. Transaction costs (e.g. paperwork, time) 
2. Financial benefits (e.g. short-term financial gain) 
3. Non-financial benefits (e.g. lifestyle benefits) 
4. Environmental outcomes (e.g. enhanced diversity in birds/plants) 
5. Interactions with the implementing agency (e.g. education, monitoring, relationships) 
6. Contract length preferences 
7. Areas for improvement in the performance of the implementing agency 
The quantitative component elicited responses on a 0–7 Likert agreement scale (0 = don’t 
know, 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, 7 = strongly agree). The dependent variable for the 
regression analysis was defined using this Likert scale, and indicated the extent to which 
participants agreed that they were likely to participate in a future conservation tender 
program. The qualitative element utilised open-format questions. Demographic information 
was also collected. The interviewer verbally delivered all questions and noted responses. A 
copy of the survey is available from the primary author upon request.  
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Face-to-face interviews were conducted in October 2012 with 23 landholders located in the 
North Central, Wimmera and Mallee catchments of Victoria, including 17 successful 
participants (obtained funding) and 6 unsuccessful participants (submitted a bid but did not 
obtain funding) in the BushTender (Stoneham et al., 2003), EcoTender (Eigenraam et al., 
2007) or Green Graze (Moll et al., 2007) programs. Participation was defined as having 
submitted a bid to the implementing agency. Access to respondents was obtained through 
snowball sampling, whereby personal networks were used to identify suitable participants 
dynamically during the structured survey period (Bryman, 2012). The sample included both 
commercial and non-commercial landholders, identified as such by directly asking 
landholders to specify the primary use of their property. Interviews generally occurred in the 
home of the respondent. This encouraged landholder commitment, especially given the 
complexity of the survey instrument.  
Respondents were assigned a numerical and a non-numerical identifier. The numerical 
identifiers reflect the order in which participants were interviewed. BT indicates participation 
in BushTender, ET in EcoTender and GG in Green Graze. The lower-case letter affixed to 
each of the BT, ET or GG identifiers denotes whether the landholder was successful (s) or 
unsuccessful (u) in obtaining a conservation contract in the particular program.  
2.4 Data 
Some survey data was analysed without regression (unstructured data) and other data was 
analysed with regression (regression data). This distinction was determined by the nature of 
the data and its relevance to the question analysed in the regression analysis (see below). The 
descriptive statistics obtained for the unstructured data are presented in Table 1, and 
discussed in Section 3. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 2, and are 
discussed in Section 4. 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 near here] 
Dummy variables were constructed for the respondent gender (GEND), farm type (TYPE), 
and respondent education (EDUC) variables (Table 2). Respondent age (AGE) was a 
categorical variable taking seven levels (1 = 0–20 years, 2 = 21–30 years, 3 = 31–40 years, 4 
= 41–50 years, 5 = 51–60 years, 6 = 61–70years, 7 = 71+ years). The proxy measure for 
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productive capacity (PROD) was a continuous numerical variable constructed by combining 
farm size and rainfall data into a single index. This proxy measure was computed through: 
PROD = farm size * rainfall * 0.0001. All other variables were ordinal categorical variables 
based upon the Likert agreement scale outlined above. Missing data were estimated using 
cubic hermite interpolation (Massopust, 2009).  
2.5 Generalised maximum entropy methods 
Regression analysis was used to analyse the capacity of a set of regressors from survey data 
to describe the likelihood of each respondent participating in a future conservation tender 
scheme. The dependent variable was an ordinal variable defined over 8 levels (Section 2.3). 








= +∑ . (1) 
where ty  is a dependent variable, kβ  are unknown parameters for 1,2,...,k K=  to be 
estimated, ,k tX  are a set of measured attributes for each parameter 1,2,...,k K=  over 
1,2,...,t N=  observations, and te  are a series of unobserved random errors.  
The statistical analysis of non-experimental data to study socio-economic phenomena is 
common, with the discipline of econometrics focused on this practice (Greene, 2012). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is the standard method used to determine the unknown kβ  in 
eq. 1 when the dependent variable y takes continuous values. OLS involves the identification 
of the regression coefficients that minimise the sum of the squared errors ( te ) across the N 
data points. In contrast, if dependent variable y takes discrete (integer) values only, then 
maximum likelihood (ML) methods, such as logit or probit models, are used that specify 
cumulative distribution functions linking outcome probabilities and the explanatory variables 
(Mittelhammer et al., 2000).  
Though widely used, these methods require that sample data be particularly well-behaved to 
provide accurate insight. Four key conditions are required: 
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1. OLS and ML methods require that there are more data points than explanatory 
variables for estimation to occur.  
2. Large sample sizes are required within both OLS and ML to increase their ability to 
estimate the true values of coefficients (Greene, 2012; Greenland, 2000).  
3. OLS and ML both require that explanatory variables are not strongly correlated with 
one another; otherwise, estimates will be unstable and have high variance.  
4. Inference from OLS and ML models is misguided if the data does not match the 
distributional assumptions made by the practitioner.  
Generalised maximum entropy (GME) methods provide an alternative means to estimate 
regression models, with either continuous or discrete dependent variables (Golan et al., 
1996). Several primary benefits are noteworthy. First, GME models can be applied where 
there are more, the same, or less explanatory variables than there are data points, as the 
measure of entropy (see below) provides a consistent and conservative means to assess the 
relative information associated with alternative solutions. Second, the use of the entropy 
measure to assess relative information content is also not sensitive to correlations between 
explanatory variables. Third, GME requires no specific distributional assumptions to be 
made; rather, the distribution of errors and coefficients is estimated from the data. Last, GME 
models provide straightforward means to include prior information. 
The GME method requires that coefficient and error terms are redefined as discrete 
probability distributions. These distributions consist of a set of probabilities, each defined for 
a fixed value (support) defined as a possible outcome for that coefficient or error term. For 
example, a coefficient could consist of the weighted average of 2 supports { }5 5,−  through 
the equation 1 25 5P Pβ = − + , where the probabilities are defined{ }1 2P ,P . The probabilities for 
the coefficient and error terms are determined through nonlinear optimisation. The 
optimisation problem involves identifying the sets of probabilities for the coefficient and 
error terms that maximise an information measure called Shannon’s entropy (Jaynes, 2003). 
(See Section 2.6 for a more formal specification of this procedure.) Maximisation of entropy 
subject to no data constraints yields a uniform distribution, which represents a state of true 
uncertainty. However, the addition of informative data points as constraints in the 




This approach is based on the maximum entropy principle, which describes that probabilities 
associated with different outcomes should be assigned such that the least informative 
distribution that satisfies the data set is generated (Golan et al., 1996). This conservative 
approach is based on the principle of indifference, which states that the least informative 
distributions should be selected if there is insufficient information to provide further 
distinction between data points (Jaynes, 2003).  
GME methods have been proven through extensive simulation experiments to provide 
improved performance, relative to traditional estimation techniques such as OLS and ML, 
when data is ill-posed (e.g. Golan et al., 1996; Golan et al., 1997). Accordingly, these 
methods have now been broadly applied particularly in agricultural economics (e.g. Akdeniz 
et al., 2011; Heckelei and Wolff, 2003; Lence and Miller, 1998; Léony et al., 1999; Paris and 
Howitt, 1998). 
Data from 23 landholders was analysed here using an entropy estimator. This sample size is 
low relative to many econometric studies, particularly those involving discrete dependent 
variables. ML methods introduce substantial bias in the analysis of small samples, 
complicating the identification of the true coefficient values (Greenland, 2000). These 
problems are promoted in ordinal regression studies, as rare events complicate the 
identification of general relationships (King and Zeng, 2001). As an information-based 
measure, GME methods identify the coefficient values that could have generated the data in 
the most number of ways. Thus, even if there is a low amount of information available, GME 
will utilise this but not extrapolate past that which is available (Golan et al., 1996). The 
capacity for the GME estimator to provide robust prediction of the dependent variable in such 
cases was evident here, given that an excellent fit of 2 0 85R .=  was obtained (Section 4.1).  
2.6 Generalised maximum entropy model 
This section summarises how GME methods can be used to estimate a model with ordered 
discrete dependent variables (Golan et al., 1997). The following subsections describe the 
technique; more detail is available in Golan et al. (1996) and Golan et al. (1997). 
In the GME method, coefficients ( kβ ) and errors ( te ) are not single values, as in OLS. 
Rather, they are redefined as the expected value of a discrete, finite probability distribution. 
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The values (supports) that an explanatory variable kβ  can take within this distribution are 
defined over an interval ,1 ,[ , ]k k Cz z , where ,1 ,2 ,...k k k Cz z z< < <  and [1,2,..., ]c C=  is an index. 
The values (supports) that an error term te  can take within this distribution are defined over 
an interval ,1 ,[ , ]t t Dv v , where ,1 ,2 ,...t t t Dv v v< < <  and [1,2,..., ]d D=  is an index.  








= ∑ , (2) 
where probabilities ,k cP  are decision variables. 








= ∑ , (3) 
where probabilities ,t dW  are decision variables. Probabilities are subject to the standard 
















=∑ .  
The probabilities ,k cP  and ,t dW  are selected through nonlinear optimisation to maximise the 
entropy criterion: 
 8 8, , , ,
1 1 1 1
ln( 10 ) ln( 10 )
K C T D
k c k c t d t d
k c t d
G P P W W− −
= = = =
= − + − +∑∑ ∑∑ . (4) 
The 810−  terms are incorporated, as otherwise the natural logarithm is undefined when either 
0k ,cP =  or 0t ,dW = . Estimation of an ordinal model using GME involves disaggregating the 
data sample into J  groups. The categorical variable is defined [1,2,..., ]ty J=  for
* * *
1 1 2 1[ , ,..., ]t t J ty y yµ µ µ µ −≤ < ≤ ≤ , respectively, where jµ  are threshold parameters for 
ordered categories [1,2,..., 1]j J= − . Threshold parameters segregate sample data into J 
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strata, consistent with standard ordinal logit models (Greene, 2012). Let jt  for [1,2,..., ]j J=  
denote the first observation in each strata and jt  for [1,2,..., ]j J=  denote the last 
observation in each strata.  
The information constraints are then defined: 
 , , , , , 1
1 1
C D
k c k c k t t d t d j
c d
P z X W v µ −
= =
+ >∑ ∑ , [ ,..., ]jjt t t∀ ∈ , 1J j≥ ≥ , and (5) 
 , , , , ,
1 1
C D
k c k c k t t d t d j
c d
P z X W v µ
= =
+ ≤∑ ∑ , [ ,..., ]jjt t t∀ ∈ , 1J j≥ ≥ , (6) 
where ,k tX  are a set of measured attributes for each of the K parameters over the N 
observations. Note from above that jµ  are threshold parameters for ordered categories
[1,2,..., 1]j J= − . The left hand side (LHS) of both equations is the entropy equivalent of the 
regression equation (defined in eq. 1), given that , ,
1
C




= ∑  and , ,
1
D




= ∑ . 
Accordingly, eq. 5 defines the lower bound for each stratum through the requirement that the 
estimated regression line (the LHS of eq. 5) must be greater than a lower bound (threshold 
1jµ − ). Likewise, eq. 6 defines the upper bound for each stratum through the requirement that 
the estimated regression line (the LHS of eq. 6) must be less than or equal to an upper bound 
(threshold jµ ). The optimisation problem involved in GME estimation is to maximise eq. 4 
subject to eqs. 5–6 and the normalisation constraints. Following optimisation, estimated 
coefficients are computed using eq. 2, while the error terms are computed using eq. 3. 
2.7 Inference and diagnostics in the GME model 
The information index kI  is a value between 0 and 1 that denotes the amount of information 
in a given coefficient. 0kI =  denotes full uncertainty regarding the true value, while 1kI =  



















The entropy-ratio statistic ( kE ) for testing the null hypothesis 0 : 0kH β =  is: 
 [ ]02k UE G G= − , (8) 
where 0G  is the maximum entropy value obtained with the constraint 0kβ =  and UG  is the 
maximum entropy value obtained when no parameters are constrained. The statistic kE  has a 
2
1χ  distribution in the limit when 0H  is true.  
The entropy-ratio statistic for the regression ( ER ) for testing the null hypothesis 0 : 0kH β =
k∀  is: 
 [ ]02 UER G G= − , (9) 
where 0G  is the maximum entropy value obtained with the constraint 0kβ = k∀  and UG  is 
the maximum entropy value obtained when no parameters are constrained. The statistic ER  
has a 2 1Kχ −  distribution in the limit when 0H  is true.  
Impact indicators ( kP ) denote the impact of an explanatory variable kX  on a dependent 
variable accounting for the magnitude of estimated slope coefficients and the sample variance 
of the explanatory variable (covariate) of interest (Ghadim et al., 2005).  
This procedure augments the standard approach (Ghadim et al., 2005) through normalising 
the value of the impact indicator according to the information content ( kI ) of the estimated 
coefficient. A higher value of an impact indicator ( kP ) denotes that an explanatory variable 
kX  has a greater effect on the dependent variable. For example, impact indicators of 
1 0.25AP =  and 2 0.5AP =  indicate that covariate A2 has twice as large an impact on the 
dependent variable, relative to covariate A1, following normalisation. 
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An impact indicator for each coefficient kβ  is computed through: 
 ( )U Lk k k kP I Y Y= − , (10) 
where LkY  and 
U
kY  are the levels of the dependent variable (computed from the estimated 
regression line) when kX  is set one standard deviation below and above its mean, 
respectively, and data lX  for l k≠  are set at their means. Each impact indicator is defined as 
an absolute value, so that consistent with previous studies (e.g. Ghadim et al., 2005), the 
higher an impact indicator for a given variable is in magnitude, the more important this 
covariate is in explaining the dependent variable. 
2.8 Application of the entropy model to the sample data 
The entropy model described in Section 2.6 was estimated using nonlinear programming in 
the CONOPT3 solver in GAMS (Brooke et al., 2012). 50 supports for the estimated 
coefficients were defined in the interval [ ]0 5 0 5. , .− . 50 supports for the error terms were 
defined in the interval [ ]0 15 0 15. , .− . Supports were selected using the general approach of 
Golan et al. (1996). First, each set of supports is defined equidistant on each side of zero. 
Second, support bounds are equal for all coefficients and for all error terms. Third, the 
number of supports is high to increase model precision. Last, bounds are estimated by 
selecting those that maximise the information content of the regression, as determined by 
normalised entropy. This decreases the chance that narrower support bounds inflate precision 
risk (Golan et al., 1996). Nevertheless, sensitivity analysis shows that the relative magnitude 
of coefficients and impact indicators is not affected by broader bound definition or increases 
in the number of support bounds used.  
3. Analysis of unstructured data 
3.1 Investment of time in conservation activity before and after the program  
Landholders only mildly agreed that the time they spent on conservation had increased during 
(TIDU, mean = 4.61) and after  their participation in the CT program (Table 1). Mean values 
reflect the average response recorded on the seven point Likert scale described in Section 2.3. 
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Most respondents were conservation-minded, with 83% of the sample stating they were 
active members of at least two environmental groups. This is consistent with the findings of 
DSE (2006) and Moon et al. (2012), suggesting that tender schemes may be failing to 
generate biodiversity benefits greatly in excess of those which would have been attained in 
any case. Efforts to engage landholders outside existing conservation communities may 
improve the additionality of outcomes achieved in CT programs. Motivation crowding effects 
may ultimately ensue where previously voluntary conservation effort becomes financially 
compensated, resulting in a net decrease in voluntary effort. Given the small sample 
examined here, there is limited evidence to support this hypothesis. However, the 
investigation of motivation crowding effects resulting from CT program implementation is an 
important area for further research.    
3.2 Contract length preferences  
Figure 1 presents the willingness of respondents to participate in contracts of specified 
durations in the future. Landholders were most willing to accept five-year (PAR5, mean = 
5.30) and ten-year contracts (PAR10, mean = 5.35) (Figure 1, Table 1), even though 50% of 
the respondents involved in five-year programs disagreed that this time-frame was sufficient 
to achieve meaningful biodiversity outcomes. Respondents felt that ten-year contracts would 
increase their chances of achieving lasting biodiversity outcomes, irrespective of climatic 
fluctuations and without limiting future management options or the resale value of their 
property. Results show a reduced willingness to accept contracts longer than ten years (Figure 
1, Table 1), with few landholders feeling that they were able to make such long-term 
commitments due to factors such as retirement or reluctance to constrain future management 
by others.  
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
3.3 Suggestions for improvement in the performance of the implementing agency  
Figure 2 displays the extent to which respondents felt particular aspects of the implementing 
agency could be improved to encourage greater participation rates in future tender programs. 
Mean scores close to the neutral point for introductory materials (IAINT, mean = 4.35), 
management actions (IAMGT, mean = 4.91), and payment schedule (IAPAY, mean = 4.09) 
indicate that these were not seen as requiring significant improvement (Figure 2, Table 1). 
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By contrast, landholders generally felt that the provision of information workshops, the 
program entry process, and bid selection required improvement, with mean scores of 5.17 
(IAINF), 5.22 (IAENT) and 5.30 (IASEL), respectively (Figure 2, Table 1). Tender programs 
typically limit the quantity of information provided to participants to minimise the possibility 
of collusion, which involves landholders conspiring to submit inflated bids (Latacz-Lohmann 
and Schilizzi, 2005). In this study, being unable to communicate with other participants, 
having limited support in constructing bids, and being confused about the bid-selection 
process left many landholders feeling isolated, frustrated, and even betrayed by the agency. 
There is evidence that landholder participants in the ESP have experienced similar issues 
(MJA, 2010a; Zammit, 2013). Our results support those of Whitten et al. (2007) and Moon et 
al. (2012), indicating a need to ensure that landholders receive assistance and support, while 
seeking to minimise collusion among them.  
[Insert Figure 2 near here] 
Monitoring is of fundamental importance to achieving conservation benefits in tender 
programs, and yet was most strongly perceived as requiring improvement (IAMON, mean = 
5.39) (Figure 2, Table 1). Most landholders submitted annual reports to the agency and 
monitoring site visits were generally infrequent or non-existent. A lack of monitoring visits 
made most landholders feel isolated and unsure of their ability to complete contracted tasks. 
Low monitoring activity by agency employees reflects transactions costs concerns and a wish 
to promote ownership of the scheme by landholders. However, our results support those of 
Morrison et al. (2008), suggesting that more active, frequent monitoring by agencies could 
enhance participation rates in CT programs. 
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4. Drivers of landholder participation in the regression analysis 
Section 4.1 discusses the fit of the regression model. The remaining sections present the 7 
most-highly ranked regressors in terms of their impact on the dependent variable, as 
measured through the impact indicator (Section 2.5). 
4.1 Model fit 
The model has a good fit to the survey data. The 2R  value indicates the strength of the 
association between the observed dependent variable and the predicted dependent variable. 
This is computed as 2 0 85R .= , which is deemed excellent considering the limited sample size 
( 23n = ) and the cross-sectional nature of the data set. The entropy ratio of the regression 
(eq. 9) tests the hypothesis that all coefficient values are simultaneously equal to zero. The 
computed value of 31.11ER =  is above the critical value for a chi-square distribution at 
24 1 23− =  degrees of freedom at a 0.001% level of significance ( 223,0.001 7.529χ = ). This 
allows us to reject the null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are simultaneously equal 
to zero. Moreover, 15 of the 24 explanatory variables are statistically significant. This result 
may be surprising given that the problem has more explanatory variables than data points, but 
is typical of the ability of entropy methods to provide insight in the presence of ill-posed data 
(Paris and Howitt, 1998).  
4.2 Relationships with staff from the implementing agency (RELA) 
The presence of strong relationships with agency staff (RELA) is identified as the predictor 
variable most strongly driving likely landholder participation in a future tender program 
(Table 2, 3). Landholders who experience a better rapport with conservation agencies are 
more likely to participate in future CT. This is consistent with the above discussion that 
respondents generally believe that better relationships with agency staff could overcome 
limitations currently perceived with the provision of information workshops, the program 
entry process, and bid selection (Section 3.3). Zammit (2013) drew attention to the 
significance of personal engagement with landholder participants in the Tasmanian Forest 
Conservation Fund, while Moon et al. (2012) emphasised the importance of two-way 
communication between landholders and government in driving participation. Accordingly, 
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investing in more positive and stable relationships with landholders is a key strategy for 
increasing participation in future tender programs.  
[Insert Table 3 near here] 
4.3 Low up-front administration costs (COPW) 
Low up-front costs relating to additional administration (COPW) had the second-highest 
impact on future participation in a tender program (Table 2, 3). Landholders who found the 
paperwork associated with the tender program to be relatively easy and straightforward 
tended to be more positively-disposed towards future participation. Discussion during the 
interviews reinforced this: 
I didn’t find the entry paperwork or the annual reports to be too bad. [LH19 
BTs] 
Several landholders found the paperwork associated with tender programs to have been very 
arduous and complicated, and a strong deterrent to future participation: 
The level of paperwork I had to wade through was overwhelming and highly 
frustrating, and in the end that’s why I quit the scheme. [LH1 BTs] 
Around 60% of our respondents agreed to some extent that the costs of completing the 
paperwork associated with the CT (which included the opportunity cost of their time) were 
low. Moon et al. (2012) obtained similar results in Queensland, finding that the majority of 
participants in conservation programs did not find the associated paperwork to be particularly 
time-consuming, although there were some exceptions. By contrast, participants in various 
conservation programs investigated by Morrison et al. (2008) indicated that the time required 
to complete paperwork was excessive. These findings indicate that efforts to streamline the 
process of entering CT programs and simplify the reporting process may promote higher 
participation rates. 
4.4 Support and education from the implementing agency (SUPP) 
Support and education by the agency (SUPP) was the third-strongest driver of likely future 
participation in a tender program (Table 2, 3). Landholders that perceived themselves as 
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having been well-supported and well-educated were less likely to participate in a future CT. 
This contradicts previous research, which indicates that support and education drives higher 
rates of participation (Whitten et al., 2007). Section 3.2 highlights that 83% of respondents 
are active members of at least two environmental groups and that generally respondents did 
not alter their conservation management efforts significantly during or after the CT program. 
Moreover, 40% of the sample found the cost of additional administrative work prohibitive. 
Accordingly, good support and education by the implementing agency may have been felt by 
participants to adequately equip them with the necessary skills to undertake future 
conservation projects, independent of agency involvement and the administrative burden 
associated with participation. This was captured well by the comments of one respondent: 
One of the major problems with these schemes is that people can’t be bothered 
wading through all the paperwork, so ultimately they end up going solo and 
just doing what they want to do independently of government, CMAs or 
environmental groups. [LH14 BTs]  
4.5 Social standing amongst neighbouring landholders (STAN) 
Enhancement of social standing amongst neighbouring landholders (STAN) was the fourth 
most powerful driver of future participation in tender programs (Table 2, 3). Some 
landholders described meeting with jealousy and opposition from their communities due to 
their participation in a CT: 
I definitely wouldn’t say [participation] enhanced my standing. [LH22 BTs]  
However, rather than deterring them from participation in conservation initiatives, such 
sentiments seemed to evoke defiance and determination: 
I don’t care what they think because I don’t do it for them. [LH8 ETs] 
Throughout the interviews, it generally appeared that the more opposition a landholder faced, 
the more willing they were to participate in future programs. 
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4.6 Good fit with existing land management or farming practices (GFIT) 
Fit with existing land management or farming practices (GFIT) was the fifth-strongest driver 
of future participation (Table 2, 3). Landholders who felt that the tender program integrated 
easily with their existing land management or farming system were less likely to participate 
in a future CT. This result is converse to the proposal of Pannell et al. (2006) that farmers will 
adopt innovations that fit easily within their farming systems. However, it is intuitive given 
the specific context of tender programs. Section 4.5 indicates that landholders may become 
confident to manage an area for biodiversity conservation independently of agency 
involvement after their contracts expire. This action also lowers administration costs. 
4.7 Benefit to others more than self (BEOT) 
The perception that tender programs were of greater benefit to others (BEOT) had the sixth-
highest impact indicator (Table 2, 3). When discussing the distribution of benefits of their 
participation in the CT, many landholders expressed a view that they had not entered the 
program with an expectation of generating immediate benefits to themselves, so much as for 
future generations or the community at large. This altruistic attitude is also very apparent in 
the qualitative results, with many landholders expressing a desire to bequeath healthier land 
to future generations.  
4.8 Significant increase to short-term farm income (STIN) 
Significant increases to short-term income (STIN) had the seventh-highest impact indicator 
(Table 2, 3). Survey results indicate that 75 per cent of respondents would participate in 
future programs, but only 25 per cent of respondents believe that conservation tenders 
increase short-term income. Accordingly, the regression reports a negative association 
between these two variables. This can be interpreted as reinforcing the importance of non-
monetary concerns in driving future participation in tender programs. 
5. Conclusions  
The primary objective of this analysis was to identify the relative importance of different 




Results from the analysis of unstructured data yield some important insights: 
• Landholders are likely to be receptive to ten-year contracts, finding that shorter 
contracts (e.g. five years or less) often fail to achieve desired outcomes, whereas 
longer contracts (e.g. 15 years or more) represent a commitment beyond what they are 
willing to accept. This suggests a tension between landholders’ desire to implement 
long-term conservation management strategies, and concerns relating to retirement, 
mortality, property sale values and options available to future generations.  
• Landholders feel that agency performance has been adequate in the areas of providing 
introductory materials and advertising, specifying management actions and payment 
scheduling. These may thus be considered low-priority targets for future 
improvements. 
• Landholders feel agency performance needs improvement in the areas of providing 
information workshops, providing support during bid construction and bid selection, 
and monitoring. These areas thus constitute high priority targets in future CT 
programs, though potential collusion remains a problem. 
Additionally, the regression analysis has identified several key factors:  
• Landholders are likely to participate in future CT programs when they have a strong, 
respectful, and continuous relationship with the implementing agency involving face-
to-face contact. CT programs are thus more likely to succeed in areas characterised by 
strong agency-landholder relationships. This is also thought to apply to the adoption 
of innovations more broadly (Pannell et al., 2006). Where such relationships are 
absent, personal engagement with landholders should be a high priority to ensure 
program success.  
• Landholders are more likely to participate in future CT programs when the 
administrative load associated with participation is low. Streamlining the participation 
process is thus likely to enhance participation in future programs. 
• Landholders with an altruistic attitude and strong conservation focus, with a relatively 
low focus on monetary outcomes, are more likely to participate in future CT 
programs. Investigating strategies to engage landholders without these attributes will 
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be critical to the achievement of broad-scale biodiversity outcomes. Accordingly, this 
has been a focus of the recent ESP (MJA, 2010a). 
• Landholders may be less likely to participate in future CT programs when they have 
the necessary skills to undertake conservation works independently and/or the 
conservation options fit well with their current system. Further research is needed to 
ensure that this relationship is consistently observed. If this is the case, ensuring that 
landholders leave programs with a high skill level and a realistic management plan 
will liberate funding to recruit new landholders into future CT schemes. 
Consideration of these factors is likely to drive higher participation rates in conservation 
tender programs. This work has shown that in conservation policies involving self-selection 
by participants, economic incentives for adoption may be of lesser importance than non-
monetary drivers. However, practical application of these results should take into account the 
limitations of this study. The sample size used is small, and the means by which respondents 
were accessed allowed considerable scope for self-selection by participants. Consequently, 
further research is needed to ensure that the key insights of this paper apply more broadly 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the unstructured (non-regression) data. The first row 
contains the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable in the regression analysis 
(DEPV), describing the likelihood of future CT participation.  
Variable 
name 
Description Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. 
DEPV Dependent variable. Likely to participate in 
future CT programs for biodiversity 
conservation. 
5.35 1.7 2 7 
DUR1 CT improved biodiversity on tender site 
during contract term 
5.00 1.57 2 7 
AFT1 CT improved biodiversity on tender site after 
contract expired 
5.52 1.38 2 7 
DUR2 CT improved biodiversity elsewhere on 
property during contract term 
4.26 1.66 1 7 
AFT2 CT improved biodiversity elsewhere on 
property after contract expired 
4.78 1.51 2 7 
TIDU CT increased time spent on biodiversity 
conservation during contract term 
4.61 1.90 2 7 
TIAF CT increased time spent on biodiversity 
conservation after contract expired 
4.87 1.69 1 7 
BEFA CT encouraged use of conservation practices 
on whole property 
4.74 1.71 1 7 
COOP CT encouraged cooperation with 
neighbouring landholders 
3.70 1.82 1 6 
OTHR CT encouraged achievement of other (non-
biodiversity) environmental benefits 
4.61 1.83 1 7 
PAR5 Willingness to participate in 5-year CT 
contract 
5.30 1.46 2 7 
PAR10 Willingness to participate in 10-year CT 
contract 
5.35 1.61 2 7 
PAR15 Willingness to participate in 15-year CT 
contract 
4.43 2.00 2 7 
PAR20 Willingness to participate in 20-year CT 
contract 
4.13 1.98 2 7 
PARPE Willingness to participate in perpetual CT 
contract 
4.35 2.21 1 7 
IAINT Agency needs to improve CT introductory 
materials 
4.35 1.87 1 7 
IAINF Agency needs to improve CT information 
workshops 
5.17 1.53 1 7 
IAENT Agency needs to improve CT entry process 5.22 1.09 4 7 
IASEL Agency needs to improve CT bid-selection 
process 
5.30 1.11 4 7 
IAMGT Agency needs to improve allowable CT 
management actions 
4.91 1.41 2 7 
IAMON Agency needs to improve CT monitoring 
schedule 
5.39 0.99 4 7 
IAPAY Agency needs to improve CT payment 
schedule 




Table 2: Results of the entropy regression. A higher value of an impact indicator shows that 
the corresponding covariate is a more important descriptor of the dependent variable, while 
the sign of the estimated coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. 
Variable Description Estimate 
( kβ ) a 
Info. 
index 
( kI ) 
Entropy ratio 
( kE ) 
Impact 
indic. 
( kP ) 
INT Intercept.  -0.21 0.07 0.68 0.01 
AGE Age of respondent.  0.29*** 0.14 12.52 0.09 
GEND Respondent is female. 0.46*** 0.56 71.47 0.22 
TYPE Farm is non-commercial. 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.00 
EDUC Respondent is university 
educated. 
0.16 0.04 1.19 0.01 
PROD Proxy measure for farm 
productivity. 
0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 
FUND CT funding was sufficient to 
cover participation costs. 
0.11** 0.02 3.93 0.01 
STIN CT significantly increased 
short-term income.  
-0.35*** 0.24 197.68 0.26 
LTIN CT significantly increased 
long-term income. 
-0.06 0.01 0.51 0.00 
RISK CT reduced financial risk. 0.36*** 0.24 19.10 0.25 
COPW CT provide low additional 
administration. 
0.39*** 0.31 15.63 0.53 
COMG CT has low ongoing 
management costs. 
-0.11 0.02 1.98 0.01 
FAIR Use of CT is fairer than flat 
payments.  
0.28*** 0.14 53.49 0.14 
FLEX Use of CT is more flexible 
than flat rate grants. 
0.23*** 0.09 25.15 0.08 
GFIT CT fit in well with current 
farming system.  
-0.40*** 0.34 21.22 0.28 
EALE CT are easy to learn about. 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 
MANA CT are easy to manage.  0.22*** 0.08 13.09 0.06 
STAN Participation in CT enhances 
standing.  
-0.37*** 0.27 18.92 0.34 
LIFE Participation in CT enhances 
lifestyle. 
0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 
BEOT Participation in CT benefits 
others more than yourself. 
0.34*** 0.22 43.50 0.27 
SUPP Participation in CT is aided by 
support and education.  
-0.38*** 0.29 34.93 0.45 
RELA Participation in CT is aided 
through strong relationships.  
0.42*** 0.38 56.44 0.59 
MONI CT are effective due to 
adequate monitoring. 
-0.17*** 0.05 17.96 0.03 
LENG CT contract was long enough 
to achieve meaningful 
conservation. 
0.068 0.007 1.16 0.002 
a Superscripts denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or the 10% (*) level. 
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Table 3: Explanatory variables that have the greatest impact on future participation. A higher 
value of an impact indicator ( kP ) shows that the corresponding covariate is a more important 
descriptor of the dependent variable. The “Effect” column indicates the direction of the 
relationship between the covariate and the dependent variable. 
Rank Impact 
indic. 




1 0.59 + RELA Aided by strong relationships with the 
agency. 
2 0.53 + COPW Low ongoing administration costs. 
3 0.45 - SUPP Aided by education and support from 
agency. 
4 0.34 - STAN Participation in CT enhances standing. 
5 0.28 - GFIT Fit with current farming system. 
6 0.27 + BEOT Participation in CT benefits others more 
than yourself 
7 0.26 - STIN Significantly increases short term income. 
 
 
Figure 1: Landholder preferences for CT contract duration. 
(4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree). 
 
Figure 2: Areas for Improvement in the Implementing Agency. Each score identifies the 
extent to which the respondent believes the agency needs to improve. 
(4 = neither agree nor disagree, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree). 
 
